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Abstract 
 
Although there have been several attempts 
to resist this conclusion, it is commonly held 
that the peculiar statistical behaviour of 
quantum particles is due to their non-
individuality. In this paper, a new suggestion 
is put forward: quantum particles are 
individuals, and the distinctive features of 
quantum statistics are determined by the fact 
that all the state-dependent properties 
described by quantum statistics are emergent 
relations.  
 
Introduction 
 
A long-standing debate in the philosophy of quantum 
mechanics concerns whether or not particles are - or at least can 
consistently be said to be - individuals, that is, entities that are 
determinately self-identical and numerically distinct from other 
entities. 
Those who favour an affirmative answer - perhaps in view 
of the fact that it seems to minimise the ‘gap’ between our 
everyday experience of physical entities and what our best 
science tells us about the ultimate basis of such an experience - 
must cope with two difficulties: 
• The fact that the Principle of the Identity of the 
Indiscernibles is violated in quantum mechanics, but 
is considered by many a plausible criterion on the 
basis of which to attribute individuality to things; 
• The ‘non-classicality’ of quantum statistics, whose 
peculiarities are readily explained by assuming that 
quantum systems are composed of non-individuals.1 
                                                 
1 The claim that since quantum particles obey a non-classical statistics they should 
be regarded as non-individuals can be found as early as Born [1926]. This position 
has later become the ‘Received View’ on the nature of quantum entities (see, for 
instance, the historical reconstruction in French and Krause [2006; Chapter 3]). 
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The former problem can only be overcome by postulating 
some form of primitive thisness that individuates the particles 
independently of their qualities.2 This paper assumes that this is 
reasonable, and deals with the latter difficulty. Section 1 gives 
an outline of classical and quantum statistics, explaining why 
the latter is commonly taken to entail non-individuality. Section 
2 considers some existing attempts to avoid this conclusion and 
their problems. Section 3 looks at the account according to 
which quantum particles are individuals with state-accessibility 
restrictions, and explains the trouble with surplus structure that 
such an account meets with. Section 4 puts forward an 
alternative proposal, based on a form of ‘ontological revision’: 
namely, on the idea that all many-particle quantum systems 
exclusively exhibit (state-independent properties and properties 
of the total system having been set aside) emergent relations 
that are entirely independent of the identities of their relata (i.e., 
of the particles). Section 5 adds a few specifications; in 
particular, a required modification to the established 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is made explicit. A 
concluding section follows. 
 
1. Classical and Quantum Statistics 
 
An outline of the basic features of quantum statistics is 
sufficient for understanding what the issue discussed here 
amounts to. 
Suppose one has N particles distributed over M possible 
single-particle microstates, and is interested in knowing the 
number of physically possible combinations.   
In classical mechanics, Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics holds. 
According to it, the number of possible distributions is   
W=MN       (MB) 
In the case of quantum particles, fewer arrangements are 
available. Bose-Einstein statistics (which applies to the particles 
known as bosons) has it that 
W= (N+M-1)! /N! (M-1)!    (BE) 
In the case of fermions, the Exclusion Principle (dictating that 
no two fermions can be in the same state) holds and further 
reduces the number of possible states, which becomes equal to 
                                                 
2 See, for a classic statement of this view, French and Redhead [1988]. This holds at 
least for bosons: see Saunders [2006] for the suggestion that fermions are 
individuated qualitatively by irreflexive relations. (This suggestion appears 
problematic, but there is no space to discuss it here). 
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W=M! /N! (M-N)!      (FD) 
The latter expresses so-called Fermi-Dirac statistics.3 
On the basis of the above, one can calculate the probability 
of a specific configuration being realised. This is, obviously 
enough, given by 
Prob(s) =T/W 
with s being the arrangement in question, and T the number 
of ways in which s can be actualised. 
For example, consider a physical system composed of two 
individuals to each one of which two equally probable states 
are available (that is, for which M=N=2). Think, for example, of 
a system composed of two fair coins. Classically, one applies 
MB and obtains 22=4 possible arrangements, each one with 
probability ¼ of being realised. In quantum mechanics, instead, 
there are only either (2+2-1)! /2! (2-1)! =3 possibilities (BE) or 2! 
/2! (2-2)! =1 possibility (FD). The probabilities are 1/3 and 1, 
respectively. Given this, it can be easily seen that, for instance, 
in the classical case the probability of an arrangement with the 
coins in different states is ½, while in the quantum case it is 
either 1/3 (BE) or 1 (FD). 
In more detail, the arrangements available in the situation 
being considered are the following (x and y being the available 
states, and with the subscripts taken to denote the – alleged – 
particle identities): 
|x>1|x>2       (C1-Q1) 
|y>1|y>2       (C2-Q2) 
|x>1|y>2       (C3)  
|y>1|x>2       (C4) 
1/√2(|x>1|y>2+|y>1|x>2)    (Q3) 
1/√2(|x>1|y>2-|y>1|x>2)    (Q4) 
C1-C4 are possible particle arrangements in classical 
mechanics, Q1-Q4 the configurations available in quantum 
mechanics. In particular, Q1, Q2 and Q3 are symmetric states, 
accessible for bosons; and Q4 the unique possible state for 
fermions (which is anti-symmetric).4 
                                                 
3 This tri-partition may be disputed, for example on the basis of the claim that 
classical systems obeying Bose-Einstein statistics are both theoretically and 
practically possible (see Gottesman [2005]). However, it looks as though a general 
distinction can in fact be drawn meaningfully on the basis of what is the case under 
normal circumstances. 
4 Q3 and Q4 describe the entangled states typical of quantum mechanics. 
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Thus, in quantum mechanics only (anti-)symmetric states 
are possible.5 For such states, particle exchanges do not make a 
difference: simply put, there is only one way for two ‘quantum 
coins’ to be one heads and one tails (quantum particles are said 
to be indistinguishable). 
Moreover, non-symmetric states are impossible in the 
quantum case (that is, analogues of C3 and C4 for quantum 
particles are never realised). This appears particularly 
problematic for those who want to defend the particles’ 
individuality. If particles truly are individuals, the question is, 
why are states that would differ from allowed ones (Q1 and Q2 
above) only as regards which value is exhibited by which particle 
not possible?6 
The available evidence, the canonical argument goes, 
suffices to conclude in favour of the non-individuality of 
quantum particles. First, particle permutations cannot in 
principle make a difference in the quantum case because 
quantum particles are not individuals, and so there are no 
identities that can be permuted. Similarly, non-symmetric states 
are ruled out because in the quantum domain it is impossible 
for a specific particle to have a certain value for an observable 
and for another specific one to have a different value for that 
observable, as the particles do not have determinate identities 
allowing for such property-attributions.   
 
2. Attempts to Avoid the Conclusion 
 
Faced with the above evidence, one who does not like the 
idea that quantum particles are not individuals can do two 
things. One possibility is to show that - contrary to what is 
commonly believed - classical particles do not in fact possess 
those distinctive features, allegedly essential to individuals, 
which are lacking in the quantum domain. The other alternative 
is more directly to resist the conclusion drawn in the quantum 
case. 
 
One well-known argument going in the former direction is 
grounded on the idea that classical particles are in fact as 
                                                 
5 Also, the two types of quantum particles necessarily conserve their symmetry-type, 
i.e., there are no transitions from a fermionic to a bosonic state (or vice versa): this is 
known as the Symmetrisation Postulate. 
6 As will be seen in what follows, this question rests on the tacit assumption that 
there is a property possessed by each particle as its property.  
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indistinguishable as quantum particles and, therefore, 
indistinguishability is insufficient for non-individuality.7 This 
view is motivated by the fact that Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics 
incorrectly predicts that mixing similar gases at the same 
pressure and temperature one experiences a change in entropy 
(this is the so-called ‘Gibbs’ paradox’). Since, as a consequence 
of this, one has to introduce an N! factor excluding 
permutations in order to make entropy correctly extensive, it 
might be concluded that classical many-particle systems are 
permutation invariant too.  
However, it can be immediately responded that, historically, 
the failure of extensiveness for entropy in the context of 
classical statistics is exactly what led to the shift to quantum 
mechanics. That is, that by eliminating permutations one is in 
fact switching to a non-classical setting.8 Following the avenue 
of classical indistinguishability, therefore, does not seem to be a 
very promising strategy for the supporter of individuality in 
quantum mechanics. 
A more complex plan, aiming to deny the existence of any 
metaphysical difference between classical and quantum 
mechanics, is developed by Huggett in a series of works ([1995], 
[1997] and [1999]). Huggett argues that the idea that particle 
permutations should make a difference if particles are 
individuals depends on a supposition as to the truth of 
haecceitism: namely, the metaphysical doctrine according to 
which possible worlds can differ exclusively with respect to the 
identities of the entities inhabiting them (i.e., be distinct worlds 
in spite of the fact that they are qualitatively identical). 
However, Huggett argues, haecceitism is by no means 
necessary for individuality. In classical statistical mechanics, he 
explains, once realistic physical systems such as gases are taken 
into account and not ‘toy systems’ such as those composed of 
idealized coins9, it is equally possible to adopt a representation 
in terms of ‘distribution space’ (i.e., a description of what 
                                                 
7 Of course, it is possible to claim that this entails that classical particles are non-
individuals too. But individuality is generally taken for granted in the classical 
domain and so the murkier notion of statistical indistinguishability is normally 
detached from individuality instead. 
8 See, for example, French and Rickles [2003; 222]. 
9 But is a two-fermion system in the singlet state of spin not a realistic system? Such 
a compound appears analogous to a two-coin classical system. Hence, if we regard 
the former as a ‘serious’ physical system, then we should do the same with the latter. 
More generally, why should certain simple systems not be relevant at the level of the 
metaphysical reconstruction of reality as Huggett claims? 
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properties are instantiated where) and of ‘phase space’ (i.e., the 
canonical description in terms of individuals with properties). 
However, only the latter is wedded to haecceitism. Since, in any 
event, we do not put into question the metaphysical status of 
classical particles as individuals, it follows from this that no 
metaphysical consequences should be drawn from our theories, 
and in particular from the formalism that we have chosen to 
adopt. This is a general conclusion, Huggett maintains, that 
applies in the quantum as in the classical case.10 
Teller [2001] and Gordon [2002], though, contend that the 
evidence pointed at by Huggett bears witness only to the fact 
that more ‘incomplete’ descriptions are sufficient in the classical 
domain; and that, especially in the quantum case, Huggett’s 
claim that metaphysics is underdetermined by physics is 
unwarranted. A simple way to spell this out is the following. As 
was said at the beginning, quantum particles (since they violate 
the Identity of the Indiscernibles) can be regarded as 
individuals only if they are attributed primitive thisness.11 It 
follows from this that a connection between individuality and 
haecceitism must in fact be drawn. For, if particles are 
individuals because they have primitive thisnesses, it may be 
the case that two of them differ merely numerically, and so 
haecceitistic differences must be deemed possible. Therefore, 
Huggett (correctly) claims that haecceitism is not implied by 
individuality, but then neglects that only for classical particles 
is all the information given once their qualities are (and, 
consequently, haecceitism does not play a role in establishing 
whether one has individuals or not). 
It thus seems that there is indeed a non-negligible difference 
between the classical and the quantum domain; and that those 
who want, in spite of this, to maintain that quantum particles 
are individuals must tackle the evidence directly and not by 
way of a form of tu quoque reasoning. 
                                                 
10 As regards entropy, Huggett, partly relying on results obtained by van Kampen 
[1984], contends that there are no observable entropic properties sensitive to a 
difference between phase space and distribution space. Although what he says in 
support of this conclusion appears correct, it can be contended that distribution 
space becomes nevertheless ‘more natural’ in view of Gibbs’ paradox. 
11 I am ignoring here Saunders’ abovementioned attempt to show that fermions are 
individuated purely qualitatively. I also disregard interpretations, alternative to 
‘orthodox’ quantum mechanics, in the context of which the things’ individuality 
coincides with their qualitative uniqueness (for instance, in Bohmian mechanics 
particles possess exclusive positions sufficient for identifying them unambiguously). 
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This leads to the consideration of the arguments of the 
second type, that is, of the arguments that attempt to block the 
derivation of non-individuality from quantum statistics. With 
respect to these, the most relevant work is no doubt Belousek’s 
[2000]. Belousek argues that whether quantum systems truly 
are permutation invariant depends on whether it is correct to 
assume the Fundamental Postulate of Statistical Mechanics (FPSM) 
- according to which every distinct equilibrium configuration 
must be assigned the same statistical weight – in the framework 
of quantum mechanics. Such an assumption, Belousek argues, 
is by no means inescapable. 
As shown by Tersoff and Bayer [1983], one can derive 
quantum statistics under a hypothesis of uniformly random a 
priori distribution of statistical weights over all possible 
microstates of the system, including permuted ones. Therefore, 
while given FPSM an assumption of distinguishability (i.e., 
sensitiveness to permutations) accounts for MB statistics and 
one of indistinguishability (i.e., permutation invariance) for 
quantum statistics, it is possible to obtain BE and FD statistics 
for distinguishable quantum particles by denying FPSM and 
postulating a random a priori distribution instead. 
FPSM is generally taken to hold because, in absence of any 
specific information about the system, it seems natural to think 
that it could be in any of the states available to it with the same 
probability. FPSM is thus rooted in the Principle of Indifference. 
However, Belousek contends, the latter is itself object of 
philosophical debate and is surely far from obviously 
compelling. Hence, since an assumption of random a priori 
probabilities may legitimately be regarded as logically weaker 
than one of equal a priori probabilities, there is room for 
abandoning FPSM along the lines suggested by Tersoff and 
Bayer.12  
Teller and Redhead [2000] raise the objection that to make 
use of FPSM is objectively preferable whenever there is no 
maximal ignorance about the system. For, once some 
information is available, interference terms arise that make 
uniform priors necessary. An alternative theory based on non-
uniform priors, Teller and Redhead explain, should 
                                                 
12 In general, Belousek claims, quantum indistinguishability is conventional in the 
sense that it depends on a subjective choice between observationally equivalent 
hypotheses. 
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satisfactorily deal with all the problems related to well-known 
no-go theorems.13 
 
The foregoing considerations should be sufficient for seeing 
that the existing proposals for avoiding the move from 
quantum indistinguishability to quantum non-individuality are 
not very forceful. In any event, even if one grants that an 
explanation of the fact that permutations are statistically 
irrelevant in the quantum domain can be found which is 
compatible with an ontology of individuals (this is all that the 
arguments just considered aim to show), the question remains 
of why non-symmetric states are excluded.14 
A customary move made by the supporters of the 
individuality of quantum particles in order to overcome the 
difficulty with non-symmetric states consists of simply 
postulating certain primitive and non-further-explicable state-
accessibility restrictions. Systems of indistinguishable particles, 
on this construal, are never found in non-symmetric states just 
because this is a fundamental feature of the world. The question 
arises, however, of whether this is sufficient or not. 
Huggett [1995] answers in the affirmative, and suggests that 
it is explanatory enough to claim that non-symmetric states are 
simply not in the symmetrised Hilbert space that correctly 
represents the actual world. Teller [1998], however, objects that 
this is not satisfactory. He points out that the view of quantum 
particles as individuals is unable to say why the world is 
described by a symmetrised Hilbert space while, for example, 
statistical mechanics can explain why a state of affairs in which 
a cold cup of tea spontaneously starts to boil is never observed. 
Furthermore, Redhead and Teller ([1991] and [1992]) 
emphasise an additional, independent difficulty: the 
assumption of alleged basic state-accessibility restrictions on 
                                                 
13 For if we consider the canonical entangled states to actually correspond to distinct 
equiprobable possibilities we are in fact postulating well-defined separate states for 
each particle (the differences among which determine the distinctness of the states of 
the total system). These are, however, exactly the states ruled out by those results 
going against (local and non-contextual) hidden-variables interpretations of quantum 
mechanics that constitute part of the ‘shared knowledge’ about the theory. 
14 The autonomy of this latter issue from that concerning permutations and 
indistinguishability is not always made crystal-clear in the philosophical literature. It 
can be easily appreciated, however, by considering the logical possibility of physical 
systems which, like classical ones, can be in non-symmetric states but whose 
statistics is, unlike classical statistics, insensitive to permutations. 
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quantum particles intended as individuals contradicts an 
essential methodological requirement. 
Redhead and Teller’s (sensible) working presupposition is 
that when some meaningful part of a theory does not seem to 
represent anything, one should elaborate on it further and 
eventually find the real-world counterpart of the bit of 
formalism apparently devoid of content. Otherwise, in 
Redhead’s [1975] terminology, one has surplus structure that can 
never become provided with content and should therefore be 
eliminated altogether. In the case under consideration, not only 
are non-symmetric states never experienced; nature would be 
entirely different if they were realized. Therefore, the 
meaningfulness of non-symmetric states in quantum theory 
indeed appears to point to in principle useless surplus structure 
that one had better get rid of. But this is problematic for those 
who want to defend the individuality of particles for the 
following reason. The only way to eliminate the surplus 
structure represented by the description of non-symmetric 
states, Redhead and Teller argue, is by opting for a formalism 
without ‘particle labels’, i.e., numbers or names appearing in 
the theory that – putatively - refer to the particles’ identities (as 
in the case of the subscripts in C1-C4 and Q1-Q4 above). The 
best candidate is the Fock space formalism of quantum field 
theory. In such a formalism, as in the distribution-space 
discussed earlier in connection to Huggett’s views, only 
information about ‘how many’ entities are in a certain state is 
conveyed and not about ‘which entity is what’, as labels are 
dropped. This, however, appears to dispense not only with the 
labels, but with what they express at the ontological level too: 
namely, the particles’ identities.15 
This is why there indeed appears to be a tension between 
the correct methodological approach to surplus structure and 
the assumption of state-accessibility restrictions on particles as 
individuals. 
Not surprisingly, Huggett does not accept Redhead and 
Teller’s conclusions. First, he claims that in the ‘particle-free’ 
quantum field-theoretic formalism states that are 
superpositions of particle number are possible which appear as 
                                                 
15 Compare with Huggett’s suggestion regarding classical mechanics that the choice 
of formalism is indifferent and so no metaphysical conclusion should be drawn. 
Here, the formalism without particle labels becomes instead preferable for 
methodological reasons and, as a consequence, a hypothesis of non-individuality 
appears again more plausible. 
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surplus structure from the point of view according to which the 
particle number is constant (in particular, from the perspective 
of quantum mechanics as a theory about individuals). Hence, 
says Huggett, the presence of surplus structure is not avoided 
by shifting to quantum field theory and Fock spaces. In fact, 
Huggett claims that the whole issue with surplus structure can 
be reduced to a negligible by-product of our choices of 
representation which should simply not be given ontological 
weight. Moreover, Huggett goes on to argue, quantum field 
theory is empirically equivalent to quantum mechanics, and so 
the fact that the former makes use of the formalism of Fock 
spaces cannot entail ontological consequences that are not 
drawn with respect to the latter as a theory about individuals. 
It is undeniable, however, that quantum field theory does 
not have surplus structure unless it is ‘looked at from the 
outside’, as it were, as it does not assume the particle number to 
be constant; while quantum mechanics appears to have a ‘built-
in’ problem with non-symmetric states as soon as it is assumed 
that its domain is constituted of well-defined individuals. In 
addition, it can be legitimately maintained that quantum field 
theory is in fact not equivalent to quantum mechanics (see, for 
example, the discussion of Huggett’s claim of equivalence in 
Gordon [2003])16; and that the former lends itself naturally to an 
ontological interpretation in terms of fields (rather than 
individual particles), which is not the case for the latter. 
More generally, at any rate, one could legitimately ask for a 
reason to regard particles as individuals in the first place once 
distribution space is assumed as the correct means to describe 
systems of many particles (remember that no ‘sources’ of 
individuality are available in the quantum domain once 
haecceitism is ruled out17, and that distribution space dispenses 
with haecceitistic presuppositions). 
 In the light of this, Redhead and Teller appear to have good 
reasons to suggest that the mere (unexplained) presence in 
quantum mechanics of meaningful descriptions of physical 
states which are never actualised (nor actualisable) is sufficient 
                                                 
16 Gordon emphasises that Fock spaces allow for states that are superpositions of 
particle number, while many-particle quantum mechanics does not; and that the 
latter, but not the former, allows for un-symmetrised wave-functions. 
17 Of course, haecceitism is not a source of individuality but rather a consequence of 
it, at least if the latter is given non-qualitatively. The point is that the fact that 
haecceitism holds bears witness to an actual fact of - non-qualitatively-determined - 
individuality. 
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for taking the statistical behaviour of quantum particles as due 
to their non-individuality. 
 
Given the foregoing discussion, that of the supporters of 
individuality in quantum mechanics appears to be a rather 
weak stance, and that quantum particles are non-individuals a 
natural conclusion to draw. The question is, however, whether 
such a conclusion is inevitable. The rest of this paper suggests a 
strategy to answer that it is not, and that it is at least possible to 
regard quantum particles as individuals, because an 
explanation of the evidence illustrated above can in fact be 
provided. 
 
3. A New Suggestion 
 
The idea that will be articulated in the rest of the paper is 
that those who want to defend the position according to which 
quantum particles are individuals must make a precise 
ontological claim: they must argue that particles in quantum 
many-particle systems never possess their state-dependent 
properties as intrinsic, and that such properties are, instead, 
always emergent properties of the whole. 
In particular, given any many-particle quantum system, they 
must regard the following as being the case. The total system 
possesses actual values for its state-dependent properties. The 
component particles, though, are only related to each other at 
the level of their dispositions to have specific values for those 
properties upon measurement. These dispositions, crucially, are 
not possessed by the particles and are instead ‘encoded’ in 
emergent relations holding between them. In a nutshell, the 
total system exhibits both actual properties and what one may 
call ‘emergent dispositional relations’. 
That the statistics is a description of the latter is a natural 
thing to claim: statistics can be generally intended as a 
description of possible outcomes of measurements (broadly 
understood), and it is a widely shared opinion that in quantum 
mechanics the latter do not uncover already possessed 
properties but rather determine, in some sense, the possession of 
actual properties. Here, in particular, I endorse the claim that 
measurements actualise certain propensities by making 
emergent dispositional relations ‘evolve into’ monadic actual 
(in philosophical vocabulary, ‘categorical’ as opposed to 
‘dispositional’) properties of their relata. 
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Let us get into more detail and see why the present proposal 
makes a difference with respect to the issue discussed in this 
paper. 
The philosophical literature on emergence is large18, but for 
present purposes it suffices to take an emergent property to be 
a property P with the following characteristics: 
 
i) P is the property of a whole constituted of simpler 
components; 
 
ii) If P is a property of the whole composed by parts a and b, 
P is not reducible to the separate properties of a and b, but has 
instead - partly or entirely - ‘new content’. 
 
Emergence can thus be regarded here as the denial of 
mereological supervenience for properties. For a traditional 
example, think of the property of ‘being in mental state x’. For 
mind-body dualists, this property is an emergent property of 
the physical wholes that we call ‘persons’. Such a property has 
the two features above: i) it is attributed to a person as a whole, 
and a person is an entity with simpler component parts; ii) the 
contents of one’s mental states are not reducible to the 
properties of one’s physical parts.19  
For emergent relations, the following also holds: 
 
iii) An emergent relation R is an emergent n-adic property of 
the whole composed of n parts which has parts x1, x2, ..., xn as its 
relata. 
 
So defined, R is a property exhibited by a whole (call it S) 
which is about the components of S (as R’s relata) but is not 
reducible to their properties. 
In addition, crucially, assume that R’s ‘content’ does not 
include reference to the identities of its relata either. To illustrate 
this with a useful example, think about two fair coins: of course, 
since these are classical objects a property of the whole such as, 
for instance, ‘one heads and one tails’ is always reducible to two 
monadic intrinsic properties (‘heads’ and ‘tails’) possessed by 
the coins separately. As a consequence, the property of the 
                                                 
18 For a recent collection of essays on the subject, see Clayton and Davies [2006]. 
19 In what follows, obviously enough, only physical components, wholes and 
properties will be considered. 
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whole does in fact say which coin is what, and thus includes a 
reference to specific identities. But if it were possible to have the 
‘one heads and one tails’ property of the two-coin system 
without having separate properties for the two coins (perhaps 
because, one could imagine, the former only describes the 
outcome of a future coin toss), then the property of the whole 
would be an emergent property that would not say anything 
about any specific coin.20 Note that, in this latter case, switching the 
coins would not give rise to a new total state: whatever happens to 
the coins’ identities, it is the case that one (without any 
specification as to which one) will be heads and the other tails. 
Still, it makes perfect sense to regard the coins as individuals. 
This, it is claimed here, is exactly what happens in the case 
of quantum many-particle systems. For these systems, one only 
has information about the particles in the form (assuming again 
two-particle and two-value systems) ‘1 has the same value as 2 
for property P, namely, x’, ‘1 has the same value as 2 for 
property P, namely, y’ or ‘1 has opposite value to 2 for property 
P’.21 According to the present proposal, all these qualitative 
descriptions, including the first two, correspond to emergent 
relations of the sort just illustrated. And here too, as for the 
strange coins above, the descriptions can be taken to be 
descriptions of individuals. 
The idea that all statistically relevant properties of quantum 
systems are emergent relations is not as ‘exotic’ as it may seem 
at first: it essentially consists of an extension to other quantum 
states of certain widely shared views regarding entangled states. It is 
commonly claimed that quantum entanglement consists of 
some form of non-separability, coinciding with the existence of 
emergent properties that belong to the entire system and not to 
the system’s component particles. Teller [1989] designates as 
particularism the view that the world is composed of individuals 
                                                 
20 It seems, on the other hand, that emergent relations are not necessarily 
independent in their ‘qualitative content’ of the identities of their relata. For 
instance, to stick to the coin example, one may have a relation saying that coin 1 will 
be heads and coin 2 will be tails, even though at the time in which the relation holds 
the coins possess neither a heads or tails value nor a disposition to have one in the 
future. Alternatively, one may have two coins with well-defined properties, but also 
additional content in the relation holding between them. For instance, in the form 
‘coin 1 heads, coin 2 tails and total mass increased by 0.5 MeV with respect to the 
sum of the coins’ separate masses’. Notice, incidentally, the role played by time-
asymmetry in defining these relations. 
21 For simplicity, the properties are expressed as if they were categorical and not 
dispositional here (and below). Strictly speaking, one finds properties such as ‘1 and 
2 will (be measured to) have the same value for property P, namely, x’ etc. 
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possessing non-relational properties, and relations among 
which supervene on their non-relational properties. He claims 
that the differences between classical and quantum mechanics 
are due to the fact that particularism is true of the entities dealt 
with at the level of the former, but not of those described by the 
latter. In the quantum domain, Teller argues, one must endorse 
relational holism: that is, the view that certain properties of the 
total system are emergent relations entirely independent of the 
properties of the system’s component parts. In particular, Teller 
considers as a reason to embrace relational holism the failure of 
outcome-independence in the case of the experimental 
confirmations of the violation of Bell’s inequalities. Relational 
holism, he holds, allows one to dispense with a tacit 
assumption of ‘ontological locality of values’, and consequently 
renders quantum mechanics compatible with relativity (see 
Teller [1989; 214-215]).22 
It can be seen that entangled states, once interpreted from 
the viewpoint of Teller’s relational holism, exhibit emergent 
relations of the type described above. Consider the singlet state 
of spin of two fermions. There is a property (the total spin) of a 
composite system reducible to the properties of the system’s 
parts, which are not in any specific state with respect to their 
state-dependent properties. The total spin property, however, 
coincides with a relation describing the future spin-outcomes for 
the separate fermions in a precise way (as opposite). This latter 
relation is independent of the fermions’ identities, as it does not 
depict either of them as being in a specific state, nor conveys 
information as to which fermion will have which value for 
spin.23 
Teller’s perspective can, therefore, be taken as the starting 
point here. The crucial addition to it - anticipated above - can 
be formulated as the suggestion that there is no reason for 
                                                 
22 The idea is that non-locality is avoided in a relational holist context because, 
according to the latter, in EPR-like settings one does not have a causal relation 
between two space-like separated events; rather, one has a causal influence on a 
single entity (the emergent relation), which then ‘propagates’ to others (its relata) 
via a causally continuous process (which is immediate in time but also transmitted 
through a physical continuum – the relation itself - rather than at-a-distance). 
23 There certainly is much to ask about the suggested ‘coincidence’ between the 
property of the whole and the relation between the (future) properties of the 
components. I am assuming here that there exist two distinct properties, one actual 
and the other dispositional, but perhaps one may put forward a stronger claim of 
identity and see the two as different ‘aspects’ of the same property? In any event, 
nothing hinges on this in the rest of the paper. 
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saying that the particularist perspective, which is agreed to fail 
for entangled systems, is valid for non-entangled ones. Indeed, 
the extension being proposed consists of the claim that quantum 
relational holism concerns not only entangled but also non-entangled 
systems; and that, as a consequence, the independence of the 
entire system’s properties (as emergent relations) of the 
identities of its components (as individuals) generalises to all 
properties and states.24 
Eventually getting to the problem being discussed, it can be 
maintained that the above is all that is needed in order to 
provide an account of quantum statistics in the context of an 
ontology of individuals. 
First of all, the perspective just envisaged entails that for all 
many-particle systems and state-dependent properties particle 
exchanges do not give rise to new arrangements (i.e., the 
identities of the particles are not statistically relevant) not 
because particles are not individuals and consequently do not 
have well-defined identities. Rather, because the particles’ 
identities do not play any role in the determination of the states that 
are described by the statistics, which are always states that exhibit 
emergent dispositional relations understood in the precise 
sense specified in this paper. As in the case of our two 
imaginary coins, switching the identities of the relata does not 
affect the qualitative content of the relation that characterises a 
many-particle quantum system. 
A closely related consequence is that one should not expect 
‘quantum analogues’ of classical states such as C4 (that is, non-
symmetric quantum states) to exist, because these would 
require a property-structure different from the one that – it is 
being claimed – is exhibited by quantum systems. That is, they 
would require individual particles that possess well-defined 
values for their observables separately from each other, which is 
exactly what is ruled out in the present framework. 
Another way to see this point is the following. If relational 
holism is true of all quantum many-particle systems, it means 
that the correspondence between states C1 and C2 on the one 
hand and states Q1 and Q2 on the other is only an appearance 
due to the formalism employed. While the former two 
effectively are states in which each particle is in a determinate 
state (that is, possesses a value for the property under 
                                                 
24 Also, but less importantly, the dispositional element emphasised here is not given 
the same relevance in Teller’s work. 
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consideration as intrinsic), the latter two are instead states in 
which there is an emergent relation but no determinate states 
for the relata, exactly in the same way as in the states described 
by Q3 and Q4. This reading of the situation makes entangled 
states look immediately much more ‘natural’ than non-
symmetric ones in the quantum case: for, if Q1 and Q2 were 
states in which each specific particle possesses a specific 
property, then Q3 and Q4 would be ‘farther removed’, as it 
were, from them than states analogous to C3 and C4, and so 
there would indeed be a reason to expect the latter to be 
realized. But if one has instead only emergent relations, then 
states exhibiting relations attributing equal values to their 
relata are unsurprisingly ‘complemented’ by states describing 
‘opposite value’ relations, i.e., by entangled states. As a matter 
of fact, other kinds of states are necessarily excluded.25 
What has just been conjectured can hold for all systems, 
independently of the number of their individual components. 
To see this, one just needs to conceive of the right emergent 
relations. For instance, considering three particles and two 
states, one has (N+M-1)! /N! (M-1)! possible states, namely 4. 
These are readily described by two ‘same value’ relations of the 
sort already encountered, plus two ‘different values’ relations: 
‘two particles have the same value for property P, namely, x, 
and one particle has the other value, y, for property P’; and ‘two 
particles have the same value for property P, namely, y, and 
one particle has the other value, x, for property P’.26   
In fact, if one thinks about it, one can see that the 
explanation27 of quantum statistics suggested here must be 
deemed satisfactory if an account based on non-individuality is. 
Because the former differs from the latter only with respect to 
‘where identity is taken out of the picture’, so to speak: 
property-type rather than property-bearers. 
 
                                                 
25 Recall the question about non-symmetric states asked in section 1, and the relative 
footnote regarding the ‘tacit assumption’ of intrinsic properties for the separate 
particles. 
26 Again, this neglects the dispositional element for simplicity. Here, the essential 
fact is that there are only two possible ways for three particles not to have all the 
same value for a two-valued observable if the relevant information is entirely 
encoded in emergent (dispositional) relations in the sense assumed here. 
27 It is important to emphasise that here we have an ontological explanation of why 
there are state-accessibility restrictions that apply to the particles as individuals, not 
(anymore) an a priori denial of the possibility of certain states being actualised. 
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In the light of the preceding discussion, questions regarding 
the ‘mysterious non-classicality’ of quantum statistics 
eventually turn out to be less problematic for the supporter of 
individuality than commonly thought. The specific identities of 
the separate individual particles, it is possible to claim, are 
simply irrelevant for the determination of any of the states that 
the statistics describes, due to the peculiar property-structure 
exhibited by quantum entities in such states.28  
 
4. Further Remarks 
 
Let us now consider some possible reactions, and add a few 
remarks. 
i) One may dislike an ontology according to which non-
supervenient relations invariably emerge in quantum many-
particle systems out of particles that possess separate actual (or, 
‘categorical’) properties when they do not belong to the same 
system. In reply to this sentiment, the following remark can be 
formulated (again). The fact of emergence being pointed at is 
something peculiar about the quantum domain in general, and 
the present proposal simply extends to other systems claims 
that are already widely accepted for certain physical composites 
(i.e., entangled systems) under any interpretation of the theory. If 
an explanation must be sought at all, it must regard the nature 
of entanglement in general rather than (or at least before) the 
present suggestion concerning quantum statistics. 
ii) One might insist on the presence of in principle 
meaningless surplus structure in the formalism of quantum 
mechanics. This response could in that case be given: it can 
equally be maintained that classical mechanics is inadequate as 
a description of the objects in its domain because it is possible 
to describe the latter entities as entangled but entangled states 
are never realised in the classical world. In general, given any 
physical theory and its formalism, it appears always possible to 
‘cook up’ some form of surplus structure. In fact, it seems 
correct to claim that what counts as surplus structure is not 
immediately determined and ontological presuppositions are 
fundamental for interpreting the theory. This is essentially the 
reason why it is contended here that the ontological explanation 
                                                 
28 Notice that such a property-structure might demand in turn an explanation. But 
this does not involve the particles’ identities and, therefore, it does not have to do 
with (non-)individuality any longer. See point i) in the next section. 
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provided in this paper succeeds where talk of inexplicable 
state-accessibility restrictions failed.29  
iii) Usually, the Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link is employed when 
interpreting the quantum formalism. According to it, a physical 
system actually possesses a specific value for an observable if it 
is in an eigenstate for that observable corresponding to that 
value. This licenses inferences such as the following: 
 
[Prob(particle x has property P with value v)=1]⇒[(Particle x 
actually has property P with value v)]    
    
 
However, it was denied earlier that in states such as, for 
instance, Q1 one has two particles each actually possessing a 
specific value for the given observable as an intrinsic property: 
the consequent in the above conditional must thus be deemed 
false. But in such states, the component particles have 
probability 1 of being detected as having that property (as they 
are in an eigenstate for that observable): the antecedent is true. 
Therefore, the Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link seems to be made 
invalid by the present proposal. 
The response to this is that, according to the ontological 
hypothesis that was put forward in this paper, one must indeed 
make an amendment to the Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link, and 
regard it as only applying to the total system. According to this 
interpretation, each separate particle in a many-particle system 
can be seen as possessing a property as intrinsic only after 
measurement (when the system will be split into distinct sub-
systems), even if it has probability 1 of possessing that property 
before being measured. Before measurement, it is maintained, 
such a probability only follows from the description of a 
disposition of the entire system and cannot therefore be 
regarded as corresponding to an actual property that can be 
attributed to the specific particle. This modification to the link - 
which is at any rate not an integral part of quantum theory and 
is modified or even abandoned also in other contexts such as, 
for instance, modal interpretations of quantum mechanics – 
should appear acceptable. Especially so once one realizes that, 
although essential from the perspective of one’s ontological 
                                                 
29 It is interesting to notice that Huggett [1995] makes the same claim about surplus 
structure (using the example of the description in the ‘language’ of classical 
mechanics of a body moving faster than the speed of light) but by way of conclusion 
of a paper that attempts to deflate the relevance of metaphysics entirely. 
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interpretation of quantum theory, such a modification does not 
make any difference in practice: we can still attribute separate 
properties to the particles that compose a non-entangled state 
before measurement exactly because we know from the 
quantum probabilities that upon measurement they will 
necessarily possess such properties. Since measurement is the 
only way to check whether a given quantum particle has a 
certain (state-dependent) property, to ask whether the particle 
already has the detected properties before measurement is 
simply otiose, and no empirical difference can possibly emerge 
between the two scenarios (i.e., with dispositions encoded in 
emergent relations and with intrinsic properties – be they 
dispositional or categorical – respectively). 
iv) It could be maintained that the picture delineated in this 
paper essentially amounts to an endorsement of Bohmian 
mechanics: the attribution of state-dependent properties to the 
‘whole system’, that is, could be regarded as basically the same 
as the attribution of them to a ‘guiding wave’. There might be 
something to this criticism, in the sense that the basic idea is in 
some way inspired by the De Broglie-Bohm view and by the 
thought that there may be a clear-cut ontological difference 
between types of quantum properties.30 But of course, the 
important difference exists that no assumption has been made 
here about uniqueness of positions and initial particle 
distribution in agreement with |Ψ|2, which are two 
distinguishing features of Bohmian mechanics. Also, crucially, 
unlike in Bohmian mechanics the notion of collapse is retained 
in the present framework. Therefore, the analogy is only 
superficial. 
A closely related objection could be that the suggested 
proposal aims to achieve something which is already obtained 
by endorsing Bohmian mechanics, and consequently turns out 
to be superfluous. This criticism, however, can easily turned on 
its head: the suggested picture of quantum reality, one could 
argue, achieves some of the allegedly important results of 
Bohmian mechanics (possibility to describe particles as (quasi-
)classical objects, reconstruction of the statistics within an 
                                                 
30 As is well-known, Bohmian mechanics takes the particles’ state-independent 
properties and their positions as essential to the particles themselves, while it 
attributes all the state-dependent properties to a wave component, ‘guiding’ the 
particles in space. The exact position occupied by the particles with respect to the 
wave determines their behaviour including, crucially, the outcomes of measurements 
of state-dependent properties. 
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ontology of individuals) without departing from what many 
see as the correct theory of the quantum world and the correct 
interpretation of it (namely, the so-called ‘orthodox’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics based on Von Neumann’s 
mathematical formalism and on the notion of collapse of the 
wave-function). True, if one is happy with Bohmian mechanics, 
one will presumably find no reason to embrace the perspective 
defined in this paper. But the present work is primarily directed 
to those who are, to the contrary, not particularly fascinated by 
Bohm’s theory and would rather stick to standard quantum 
mechanics (perhaps, provided that the latter could be shown to 
be consistently interpretable in terms of individuals). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Contrary to a widespread belief, it can be concluded, it is 
possible to formulate an explanation of quantum statistics from 
a perspective according to which quantum particles are 
individuals. This explanation is based on an extension of 
property holism (in particular, of Teller’s relational holism) to 
all state-dependent properties of quantum many-particle 
systems, and an ensuing modification of the Eigenstate-
Eigenvalue Link. The resulting ontological picture allows one to 
claim that quantum statistics is, unlike classical statistics, 
insensitive to permutations because the latter are not relevant at 
the level of the property-structure that the statistics describes. 
And that, in particular, non-symmetric states are not 
mysteriously unrealisable but rather rendered impossible by 
the fact that the state-dependent properties of quantum 
particles in many-particle systems are never possessed by the 
single particles as intrinsic. 
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